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In what follows I distinguish two different senses in which philosophers
speak of moral verdicts, senses that in turn invite two different senses of
moral overridingness.Althoughoneof these senses ofmoral verdict currently
dominates the moral overridingness debate, I focus primarily on the other,
and on the importance of disambiguating the two. In section II I show that it
is this other sense that offers the most straightforward explanation of the
apparent conceptual connections between moral verdicts and both reasons
and reactive attitudes. I demonstrate in section III that it is also the central
sense deployed by moral theories that recognize distinctively moral reasons,
but that need not appeal to distinctive moral verdicts from a distinctively
moral point of view. In section IV I show that as more sophisticated variants
have been developed within the dominant sense of moral verdict they have
come to deploy central elements of this alternative sense, bringing the two
closer together. I suggest along theway that the recent tendency to emphasize
the dominant sense to the exclusion of the alternative, coupled with the
failure to properly disambiguate the two, has fundamentally skewed central
debates in moral theory. Finally, in section V I sketch a proposal for
understanding the relationship between these two distinct senses.
One standard presentation of the overridingness debate provides a
particularly useful vehicle for distinguishing these two different senses of
moral verdicts and moral overridingness. The defense of overridingness,
on this standard approach, typically involves arguments for something
like the following two claims:
Claim 1: Agents are morally required to perform certain actions.
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Claim 2: If agents are morally required to perform certain actions, then they
have decisive reasons that are in some sense distinctively moral to perform such
actions.1
Consider first the conditional, Claim 2. Many philosophers take this
claim to capture a conceptual truth about moral verdicts.2 Others
take it to be a substantive claim, and many of these philosophers take
this substantive claim to be false.3 How can one and the same claim
strike so many philosophers working on moral verdicts and over-
ridingness as a conceptual truth, and strike so many others as a
substantive claim that is pretty clearly false? The explanation of this
striking divergence, I suggest, is that philosophers in these two groups
are appealing to very different senses of moral verdict, in this case of
moral requirement.
The first sense takes such moral verdicts to reflect decisive reasons for
acting from a distinctively moral standpoint, viewpoint, or point of
view.4 The second sense takes moral verdicts to reflect decisive reasons
1 The locus classicus of this traditional characterization of moral overridingness is Philippa
Foot’s “Are Moral Considerations Overriding?” in Virtues and Vices (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1978), pp. 181–8. She characterizes this as “verdictive” rather than “eviden-
tial”moral overridingness. There are myriad defenses and criticisms in the literature of claims in
the neighborhood of Claim 2. See for example Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1984), p. 65; Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), p. 28: “MR: If a subject, S, is morally required to perform an act, x,
then S has most (indeed, decisive) reason to perform x, all things considered”; and Alfred
Archer, “Moral Rationalism Without Overridingness,” Ratio 27 (2014): 100–14, particularly
his characterizations of weak overridingness and moral rationalism (pp. 104–5). I will follow
Foot’s initial characterization of claims such as Claim 2 as “verdictive” rather than “evidential”
moral overridingness claims.
2 See, for example, Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 64, and Stephen Darwall, The Second-
Person Standpoint (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 94. See section III for
a fuller discussion.
3 This is the position defended, for example, by Foot herself (“Are Moral Considerations
Overriding?”), and more recently by philosophers such as Dale Dorsey (“Weak Anti-
Rationalism and the Demands of Morality,” Noûs (March 2012): 1–23).
4 Such talk of moral, prudential, aesthetic, etc. standpoints or points of view pervades
contemporary normative ethics, but what commitments are involved in such talk is often as
obscure as such appeals are pervasive. A characteristic feature of virtually all such accounts,
however, is that they issue distinctively moral verdicts from such distinctively moral points of
view. This aspect of all such accounts raises the separate question as to what the relationship is
between such moral verdicts from a distinctively moral point of view and the reasons simpliciter
that agents have to act. It is this shared feature of such accounts that is central to the arguments
that follow.
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simpliciter5 for acting that are in some sense distinctively moral.6
Because the first sense invokes decisive reasons from a distinctively moral
standpoint, I will refer to it in what follows as the moral standpoint sense,
and to the resulting verdicts asmoral standpoint moral verdicts. Because the
second sense invokes decisive reasons simpliciter that are in some sense
distinctively moral, I will refer to it as the rational standpoint sense, and to
such verdicts as rational standpoint moral verdicts. To claim that we are
rational standpoint morally required to perform actions of a certain type,
e.g., to keep our promises, is to claim that we have decisive reasons
simpliciter to keep our promises that are in some sense distinctively
moral, at least ceterus paribus. It is to claim that we ought to keep our
promises in the standard decisive reasons sense of ought, and that the
reasons why we should do so are in some sense distinctively moral reasons.
To claim that we are moral standpoint morally required to perform actions
of a certain type, e.g., to promote the overall good, is to claim that we have
decisive reasons to promote the overall good from a distinctively moral
point of view. Such a verdict leaves open the question of what relationship
there is between such decisive reasons from a distinctively moral point of
view and the agent’s reasons simpliciter to act. Do we have reasons
simpliciter to do what is moral standpoint morally required, and if so,
are such reasons simpliciter decisive with respect to other reasons, reasons
that may themselves be distinctively prudential or aesthetic? On the
rational standpoint sense, claims of moral requirement are claims of
rational requirement simpliciter. On this moral standpoint sense, claims
of moral requirement are claims of rational requirement from a distinct-
ively moral point of view, claims that leave unspecified the relationship
between rational requirement from a distinctively moral point of view and
rational requirement simpliciter.
Such distinct senses readily account for the striking divergence in
understandings of Claim 2. For those deploying the rational standpoint
5 In this paper I bracket skeptical challenges to the standard view that there are reasons
simpliciter, for example the challenge offered by David Copp in “The Ring of Gyges: Over-
ridingness and the Unity of Practical Reason,” in Morality in a Natural World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 284–308.
6 Notice that I stop short in this formulation of identifying moral requirement with decisive
reasons simpliciter that are distinctively moral. This is in part to accommodate views such as
Stephen Darwall’s, upon which such decisive distinctively moral reasons are a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for moral obligation, hence for moral requirement.
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sense, moral requirements are rational standpoint moral verdicts, reflect-
ing decisive reasons simpliciter for acting that are in some sense distinct-
ively moral. Claim 2 is, on this rational standpoint understanding, a
conceptual truth that merely makes explicit one aspect of what it is for
some action to be morally required. For those deploying the moral
standpoint sense, by contrast, moral requirements are moral standpoint
moral verdicts, reflecting only decisive reasons for acting from a distinct-
ively moral standpoint, viewpoint, or point of view. Claim 2 is on such a
moral standpoint understanding a substantive claim about the relation-
ship between decisive reasons from the distinctively moral point of view
and decisive reasons simpliciter. If agents sometimes do not have decisive
reasons simpliciter to do what they have decisive reasons to do from the
distinctively moral point of view, then this substantive claim will be false.
Our two claims also provide a useful tool for isolating the two very
different questions of moral overridingness invoked by these two differ-
ent senses of moral verdict. Operating with the moral standpoint sense
themoral standpoint overridingness question is, quite simply, the question
of whether Claim 2 is true. Claim 1 is typically granted by those who
adopt this sense. That is, it is typically granted that there are moral
verdicts reflecting decisive reasons from a distinctively moral point of
view. The question is whether it is always (typically?) true that if agents
are moral standpoint morally required to perform these actions or types
of actions, they have decisive reasons simpliciter that are distinctively
moral to do so (Foot’s Verdictive Moral Requirements). If so, morality is
moral standpoint overriding; if not, it is not.
For those operating within the rational standpoint sense, by contrast,
Claim 2 is trivially true—if agents are morally required to perform
certain actions, this is just to say, in part, that they have decisive reasons
that are in some sense distinctively moral to perform them. The question
of rational standpoint overridingness is instead whether, given the truth of
Claim 2, Claim 1 is itself true. Are there acts or act types which rational
agents have overriding reasons that are distinctively moral to perform, at
least ceterus paribus? Michael Smith offers an analogy with witches to
clarify the overridingness question within this rational standpoint sense
of moral verdicts. It is a conceptual claim (at least let’s allow this) that
witches have supernatural powers; it is a substantive claim whether there
are any witches, and if so, who they are and what might be the nature of
their powers. Similarly, it is a conceptual claim that rational standpoint
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moral verdicts provide agents with decisive reasons simpliciter to act, but
it is a substantive claim whether there are such rational standpoint moral
verdicts—whether and when agents in fact have overriding reasons that
are distinctively moral.7 Rational standpoint overridingness concerns the
truth of this latter, substantive claim.
It is instructive to consider the implications of disambiguating these
distinct senses for Peter Singer’s influential argument that the more
affluent are morally required to spend themselves down to subsistence
to alleviate poverty—that it is morally wrong not to do so. Is the result of
this argument a moral standpoint moral requirement, claiming only that
there are decisive reasons to do so from a distinctively moral point of
view, or is it a rational standpoint moral requirement, claiming that
agents have decisive reasons that are distinctively moral to do so?
Singer initially seems clearly to be invoking the moral standpoint
sense, rendering a verdict that only takes into account other consider-
ations “comparable in moral significance”8 (emphasis mine). Such ver-
dicts that result from taking into account only distinctively moral
considerations, the considerations relevant from a distinctively moral
point of view, will yield only moral standpoint moral verdicts. But the
qualifier “moral” disappears in the conclusion of Singer’s argument—
such sacrifice, Singer concludes, “is something that everyone ought
to do.”9 This “ought” simpliciter suggests that the argument establishes
decisive reasons simpliciter that are distinctively moral, a rational stand-
point moral verdict.
But later in Practical Ethics Singer is clear that it does not. The
conclusion establishes at most “what we ought, morally, to do,” a
moral standpoint moral requirement from “a standpoint like that of
the impartial spectator.”10 He is also clear that he has not demonstrated
7 Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 64. Darwall draws a similar distinction, arguing that even if
it is a “conceptual matter” that “genuine moral oughts would provide . . . reasons that are
conclusive for all agents . . . it might be that no putative moral ought actually provides these
reasons” (Stephen Darwall, “Morality and Practical Reason,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical
Theory, ed. David Copp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 283). Whether there
are such moral oughts that actually provide these reasons is the question, for those operating
within the rational standpoint sense, of whether Claim 1 is true. This is the question of rational
standpoint overridingness.
8 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 169.
9 Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 169.
10 Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 201 and 204 respectively.
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that rational agents ought simpliciter to spend down to subsistence, in
the decisive reasons implying sense of ought that is “simply . . . a way of
asking for reasons for action without any specification about the kinds of
reasons wanted.”11 Such an argument would require the additional
demonstration of “a link between reason and ethics,” but Singer takes
all such attempts to have failed. Indeed, because he endorses the
“Humean” view that “reason in action applies only to means, not
ends,” and that such ends “must be given by our wants and desires,”12
his view suggests that whether a given agent has any reason, much less
decisive reasons, to do what is moral standpoint morally required is
entirely a function of the relative strengths of that agent’s aesthetic,
prudential, ethical, and other desires.
Often those who deploy the moral standpoint sense of moral verdict
are happy to allow that moral standpoint moral requirements are
reflected in strong reasons simpliciter that are distinctively moral.
Decisive reasons from a distinctively moral point of view, they allow,
are typically reflected in strong reasons simpliciter. But the tendency to
conflate the two senses of moral verdict can obscure the need for those
deploying this moral standpoint sense to provide a substantial account of
the relationship between decisive reasons from the distinctively moral
point of view and reasons simpliciter. The need is particularly pressing in
cases, such as those of Singer and many other traditional consequential-
ists, in which what is taken to be moral standpoint morally required far
exceeds what commonsense suggests that we have decisive reasons
simpliciter to do. Singer, we have seen, not only does not purport to
demonstrate that his moral standpoint moral requirements are typically
reflected in decisive reasons simpliciter, he takes the most plausible
account of reason to stand in the way of providing such an account.
Bernard Williams goes a step further, arguing that traditional act conse-
quentialist theories are structurally incapable of providing such an account.
He makes the case that in their very determination of impersonal moral
11 Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 203.
12 Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 207. But see Singer’s more recent work (with Katarzyna De
Lazari-Radek, The Point of View of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)) in
which he abandons such Humeanism about reason to go where even Henry Sidgwick feared to
tread, arguing that the moral point of view, understood as the point of view of the impartial
spectator, is the rational point of view. On such an account whatever actions are moral
standpoint morally required are, trivially, rational standpoint morally required.
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requirements, such consequentialists deploy an account of practical reason
and deliberation upon which the reasons agents have to conform to such
moral requirements are but some reasons among others. These other
reasons, he suggests, often seem sufficient for the agent not to do what
morality requires. Reason, as such consequentialists must understand it,
alienates rational agents from their own standards of moral standpoint
moral requirement.13 At the very least, Williams’ arguments demonstrate
that those working within the moral standpoint sense cannot simply help
themselves to the rational authority of their moral standpoint moral
requirements. Such authority must be earned through argument;Williams
makes the case that it often cannot be.
Thus, disambiguation of these two senses of moral verdict and moral
overridingness has clear implications for specific arguments that have
been put forward in normative ethics. Nonetheless, I suggested above
that in current debates concerning moral verdicts and moral overriding-
ness it is the moral standpoint sense that appears to dominate. If there is
no longer a significant role for the rational standpoint sense to play, or if
there is, but the moral standpoint sense is clearly the more fundamental
of the two, then the dominance of the moral standpoint sense in the
framing of recent debates concerning moral overridingness and moral
verdicts is clearly warranted, and the significance of the disambiguation
going forward will be limited. In what follows, however, I will argue that
(1) it is the rational standpoint sense that provides the most straightfor-
ward explanation of the apparent conceptual connections between moral
requirements and both decisive reasons and reactive attitudes, (2) it is the
rational standpoint sense that is central for moral theories that distin-
guish distinctively moral reasons but not distinctive moral verdicts from
a distinctively moral point of view, and (3) many of those who deploy the
moral standpoint sense have, in the face of serious challenges, modified it
to approximate more and more closely the rational standpoint sense. As a
result, many structural features of rational standpoint moral verdicts that
may initially have seemed problematic from within the context of the
13 See, for example, Williams’ arguments on pp. 100–18 of Utilitarianism: For and Against
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), particularly his conclusion that “It is absurd
to demand of such a man . . . that he should just step aside from his own projects and decision
and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires” (p. 116). For a defense of
this interpretation of Williams’ argument, and an argument that it generalizes quite widely, see
my Beyond Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 66–90.
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moral standpoint sense have on such accounts come to be features of
moral standpoint moral verdicts as well. Moreover, I will suggest, in
closing, that these senses should not be understood as mutually exclusive
and conflicting, but as each responsive to fundamentally different
questions.
Before attempting to rehabilitate the rational standpoint sense, I will
first draw a clearer contrast between the two senses, beginning with the
moral standpoint sense. Many philosophers take the moral standpoint
sense to be the sense of moral verdicts and moral overridingness. Thus,
Dale Dorsey suggests that a central question regarding moral verdicts is
whether, whenever the system of moral norms “issues a requirement, this
requirement is dispositive,” where dispositive requirements provide
“decisive reasons for a to x.”14 Moral verdicts are rational verdicts relative
to a distinctive “system,” perspective, point of view, or standpoint; it is a
separate question whether agents have decisive reasons to do what
morality in this sense requires—whether moral verdicts always yield
rational verdicts simpliciter for distinctively moral reasons. If so, Claim
2 is true, and morality is moral standpoint overriding. If not, Claim 2 is
false—so much the worse for the claim that morality is moral standpoint
overriding. Shelly Kagan takes a given action to be morally required “if
and only if it is supported by a morally decisive reason,”15 but takes it to
be clear that such a reason “needs to be decisive only in comparison to
the other morally acceptable reasons,” such that the resulting action may
well be “morally required, and yet the agent is nonetheless rationally
required . . . not to react in that way.”16 Moral verdicts tell us only “what
people should do from the moral point of view,” understood as one point
of view among others.17 The question of what moral standpoint moral
verdicts there are can be taken up without even considering the question
of what reasons simpliciter, if any, an agent may have to do what is
supported by such a moral standpoint moral verdict. Moreover, only if
the answer is that all (or almost all) moral standpoint moral verdicts are
reflected in decisive distinctively moral reasons simpliciter is morality
moral standpoint overriding. This is what is required for the truth of
14 Dorsey, “Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demands of Morality,” pp. 4–5.
15 Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 65.
16 Kagan, The Limits of Morality, p. 66.
17 Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), p. 10.
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Claim 2 within the moral standpoint sense of moral requirements.
Similarly, Samuel Scheffler suggests that the question of overridingness
is the substantive question of whether, “given an overall verdict about
what one morally ought to do, one cannot rationally defy it.”18 Con-
tractualist critics of consequentialism also often operate within the moral
standpoint sense. Tim Scanlon, for example, takes the overridingness
question to be the moral standpoint overridingness question, the sub-
stantive question of “why a person has reason to do . . . what morality
demands.”19 In the next section I will clarify the alternative rational
standpoint sense, and begin to make the case for its rehabilitation.
SECTION II: CONCEPTUAL CONNECTIONS
Commonsense and intuition are often taken to reveal a sense of moral
verdict that involves a conceptual connection to decisive reasons. It is
taken to be part of the very concept of moral requirement, for example,
that to judge some action to be morally required is, at least in part, to
judge that there are decisive reasons to perform the action. Such a
connection is invoked by Smith, with his claim that “our concept of
moral requirement is the concept of a reason for action; a requirement of
rationality or reasons,20 and by Sidgwick, with his claim that “we
commonly think that wrong conduct is essentially irrational.”21 Gibbard
as well identifies such a connection as a component of our commonsense
notion of moral requirement,22 as do Williams23 and Darwall. The latter
stresses “conceptual connections between imputing wrong and blame,
and between blame and attributing authoritative reasons.”24 Each
appeals to a sense of moral requirement upon which to issue such a
moral verdict is, at least in part, to issue a rational verdict.
18 Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 26.
19 T. M. Scanlon, Being Realistic About Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014),
p. 1. See also p. 22: “There is therefore a question . . . whether the usual ways of establishing that
a form of conduct is wrong also guarantee that there are good reasons not to engage in it.”
20 Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 64.
21 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), p. 23.
22 Alan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1990), p. 299.
23 Bernard Williams, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” in Making Sense of
Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 42–3.
24 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, p. 94.
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Such a conceptual connection is taken to be demonstrated by many
features of the discourse of moral requirement. For example, Alfred
Archer and others highlight a common use of moral verdicts upon
which sufficient evidence that one is not morally required to perform
some action is provided by the demonstration that one has sufficiently
good reasons to perform some other action. If I have sufficient reasons to
do a, I am not morally required to do b instead.25 Such claims of moral
requirement are also recognized as settling the question of what we have
most reason to do.
Indeed, such commonsense moral verdicts are taken to invoke a nexus
of conceptual connections among (1) moral verdicts, (2) characteristic
reactive attitudes such as blame and guilt, and (3) conclusive or decisive
reasons of a distinctly moral sort for action. These verdicts identify
actions that agents are purported to have decisive distinctively moral
reasons to perform or forbear from performing, actions that it is appro-
priate to blame them for performing or failing to perform, ceteris
paribus, and that it is appropriate for the agents themselves to experience
guilt for performing or failing to perform. Reactive attitudes of blame
and guilt appear to be appropriate precisely in cases in which some agent
violates such a moral verdict. Demonstration that an agent had
decisive—or even simply sufficient—reasons to do what she did seems
to suffice, on this common understanding, to demonstrate that such
reactive attitudes have no place in the case at issue.26 If I hold you
blameworthy for some action, but come to agree that you in fact had
perfectly good and sufficient reasons for doing what you did, reasons that
would have provided me with justification for acting similarly in similar
circumstances, it would seem to show a lack of understanding of the
relevant concepts to nonetheless continue to maintain that you are
blameworthy. As Gibbard argues, “To judge that it fully makes sense
to do a thing is, in effect, not to rule out doing it oneself,” but any
characteristically moral reactive attitude “seems incoherent when joined
to the thought ‘If I am in his shoes let me do the same.’ ”27
25 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, p. 97; Sarah Stroud, “Moral Overridingness and
Moral Theory,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998), p. 176; Archer, “Moral Rationalism
Without Overridingness,” pp. 107–9.
26 Darwall, “Morality and Practical Reason,” pp. 290–2; Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt
Feelings, p. 299; Williams, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” pp. 42–3.
27 Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, p. 299.
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The moral standpoint sense, upon which moral verdicts reflect
decisive reasons from a distinctively moral point of view, is difficult to
reconcile with commitment to such commonsense conceptual connec-
tions. For those operating within this sense, it appears to be a substantive
question whether verdicts reflecting decisive reasons from a distinctly
moral point of view, moral standpoint moral verdicts, always yield
rational standpoint moral verdicts. Particular moral theories return a
“no” answer to such a substantive question; moreover, counterexamples
abound that are also often taken to support this negative answer. These
examples purport to demonstrate that we often do not have decisive
reasons to do what we have decisive reasons to do from the moral point
of view (what is moral standpoint morally required), hence that such
apparent conceptual connections in fact fail to obtain.28 Those operating
within the moral standpoint sense often follow Foot in attempting to
explain both why there appear to be such conceptual connections, and
why such appearances are nonetheless misleading.29
By contrast, the rational standpoint sense of moral verdicts provides a
straightforward explanation of such conceptual connections that con-
firms appearance and aligns with intuition and commonsense. A rational
standpoint moral verdict just is a rational verdict for decisive reasons that
are in some sense distinctively moral. For those operating within the
rational standpoint sense, there appear to be such conceptual connec-
tions because there are such conceptual connections. If a judgment of
moral requirement is such a judgment that there are decisive reasons to
act that are distinctively moral, reasons that are in this sense overriding
with respect to all other competitors, then the demonstration that the
agent has good and sufficient reasons to do something else is a demon-
stration that such a judgment is misguided, just as our everyday practices
suggest. A similar point can be made about blame.
Many philosophers who have teased out this presumptive connection
between moral verdicts and decisive reasons for acting, e.g., Michael
Smith and Douglas Portmore, invoke this rational standpoint sense of
moral verdict. Smith emphasizes that moral verdicts are rational verdicts
of a distinctive kind, such that moral verdicts “seem to be, or imply, opinions
28 Such counterexamples will be discussed in section IV.
29 See, for example, “Are Moral Considerations Overriding?” in her Virtues and Vices.
I discuss her arguments further in section IV.
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about the reasons we have for behaving in certain ways.”30 It is a
conceptual truth, he claims, that “If agents are morally required to phi
in circumstances C then there is a requirement of rationality or reason
for all agents to phi in circumstances C.”31 Such claims are difficult to
reconcile with the moral standpoint sense, but follow naturally from the
rational standpoint sense. Portmore, for his part, appeals to a sense of
moral requirement upon which “non-moral reasons will prevent moral
reasons from generating moral requirements when they successfully
counter them.”32 Here Portmore invokes all of the elements of the
rational standpoint sense to clarify the nature of the presumptive con-
nections. There are distinctively moral reasons; we are morally required
when such distinctively moral reasons are decisive with respect to
other reasons; we are not morally required when they are not, in
particular, when they are countered by sufficient non-moral reasons to
act otherwise.33
SECTION III: MORAL THEORIES WITHOUT MORAL STANDPOINTS
I have made the case that it is the rational standpoint sense of moral
verdict and moral overridingness that provides the most straightforward
explanation of the apparent conceptual connections between moral
verdicts on the one hand, and decisive reasons and reactive attitudes
on the other. In this section I will argue that it is also the fundamental
sense of moral verdicts and moral overridingness for moral theories that
appeal to distinctively moral reasons, but do not appeal to distinctive
30 Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 7.
31 Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 65.
32 Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, p. 42
33 Such an alternative understanding of moral verdicts also illuminates one source of
confusion surrounding the moral demandingness debate. A moral theory is too demanding,
Portmore suggests, if “it holds that agents are morally required to make sacrifices that they do
not have decisive reason to make, all things considered” (Commonsense Consequentialism, p. 26).
This is clearly a serious problem within the rational standpoint sense. If an action is rational
standpoint morally required, then I have decisive reasons to perform it. But ex hypothesi I do
not have decisive reasons. Therefore, I am not rational standpoint morally required, and a moral
theory which claims that I am morally required to perform such actions is undermined. Viewed
from within the moral standpoint sense, by contrast, the objection loses considerable force. If
I do not have decisive reasons to do what is moral standpoint morally required, it does not
follow that I am not moral standpoint morally required, hence it does not follow that a moral
theory claiming that I am is straightforwardly undermined.
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moral verdicts reflecting decisive reasons from a distinctively moral point
of view. Those operating exclusively within the moral standpoint sense
often take all alternative moral theories to issue moral standpoint moral
verdicts, verdicts from a distinctively moral point of view, and take the
question of overridingness to be the question of moral standpoint over-
ridingness: whether such moral standpoint moral verdicts are in
(almost?) every case reflected in decisive distinctively moral reasons
simpliciter. But if on certain theories the standpoint within the context
of which distinctively moral reasons come into view, and are judged
decisive with respect to other reasons, is the standpoint of reason itself,
the relevant sense of moral verdict for such theories will reflect moral
reasons that are decisive with respect to other reasons from this stand-
point of reason—rational standpoint moral verdicts.
This would perhaps be a merely notional worry if no moral theories
with such structural features were among the plausible alternatives. But
examples are readily available of moral theories upon which the relevant
standpoint within which distinctively moral reasons come into view is
the standpoint of reason simpliciter. On one standard interpretation,
Kant himself takes the standpoint from which distinctively moral reasons
come into view, and from which the competing claims of distinctively
moral and non-moral reasons are properly adjudicated, to be the stand-
point of reason. David Brink suggests that for Kant distinctively moral
reasons “apply to me in virtue of those very features that make me a
responsible agent, capable of practical deliberation and subject to reasons
for action.”34 Such distinctively moral reasons are distinguished by the
role that they play within the standpoint of reason. In particular,
categorical imperatives are distinguished from hypothetical imperatives
because the latter reasons “depend upon interests and desires” while the
former are “demands of pure practical reason.”35 It is natural on such an
interpretation to understand moral requirements as rational standpoint
moral verdicts generated by decisive distinctively moral reasons—
decisive pure practical reasons. It is not clear that there is even a place,
on such an interpretation of Kant, for a distinctively moral standpoint, or
for a sense of moral verdicts as arrived at from a distinctively moral
34 David Brink, “Kantian Rationalism,” in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity
and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 281.
35 Brink, “Kantian Rationalism,” p. 286
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standpoint, or for the overridingness question understood as a question
about the relationship between such moral standpoint moral verdicts
and decisive reasons simpliciter.
It might be argued, against any such account, that morality is dis-
tinctively impartial, and that impartiality, even for Kant, is the hallmark
of a distinctively moral point of view. But this overlooks the possibility
that for Kant the standpoint of reason is itself impartially structured,
hence that moral reasons are not distinguished by the impartiality of the
standpoint within which they come into view, but by their distinctive
role within the impartial standpoint of reason. Brink advocates just such
an understanding of Kant, arguing that hypothetical imperatives as
well are “conditioned on interests or desires that one has that are not
ruled out or screened off by the moral law.”36 Even such hypothetical
imperatives make their demands within an impartial deliberative struc-
ture. When categorical imperatives decisively dictate certain courses
of action, an agent has decisive distinctively moral reasons to perform
such actions, and they are rational standpoint morally required. When
hypothetical imperatives alone dictate certain courses of action, such
actions are not morally required. Both hypothetical and categorical
requirements of reason come into view within the same fundamentally
impartial standpoint, but it is the standpoint of reason, and the
resulting moral verdicts are rational standpoint moral verdicts.
Barbara Herman develops a somewhat different interpretation of
Kant that is nonetheless similar in these relevant respects.37 On the
Kantian account, Herman argues, desires “normally contain . . . a con-
ception of the object’s value . . . as determined by its fit with other things
valued, and as its satisfaction . . . comports with the principles of practical
reason.”38 To cite such desires or their objects is to invoke paradigmat-
ically “partial” reasons, but for Kant such reasons have been normalized
within the impartially structured space of practical reason. The rational
agent’s impartially structured “deliberative field” normalizes affective
experiences such that the value of the objects of our desires reflects
whether their satisfaction comports with the principles of practical
36 Brink, “Kantian Rationalism,” p. 286.
37 See in particular her “Making Room for Character,” in her Moral Literacy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1–28.
38 Herman, “Making Room for Character,” p. 17.
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reason, most fundamentally of pure practical reason.39 On such inter-
pretations of Kant moral verdicts are arrived at from an impartial point of
view, but the impartial point of view is the standpoint of reason, and
such moral verdicts are rational verdicts for distinctively moral reasons
(rational standpoint moral verdicts) that come into view within this
impartially structured standpoint of reason. When reasons that are not
distinctively moral are sufficient or decisive, the agent is not morally
required to act. There is clearly a place, on such an interpretation of
Kant, for distinctively moral reasons, rational standpoint moral verdicts,
and rational standpoint overridingness. But what place is there for moral
standpoint moral verdicts and moral standpoint overridingness? Stephen
Darwall points out that although for Kant we have moral reasons
to donate to the poor, Kant “does not say, however, that the moral
reasons supporting donation . . . invariably outweigh the reasons for not
giving.”40 In cases in which they do not outweigh, the agent is
not morally required to donate because such a course of action is not
decisively favored by reasons simpliciter that are distinctively moral. It is
the rational standpoint sense of moral requirement that is relevant;
moreover, there would appear to be no sense on such an account in
which donating to the poor is morally (but not rationally) required.
Adam Smith’s Enlightenment take on virtue ethics invites an inter-
pretation that is similar in these respects. The standpoint of
reasonableness—of prudence, beneficence, temperance, courage, justice,
etc.—is the standpoint of the “impartial spectator.”41 Reasonable per-
sons guard against the distorting effects of self-love by developing certain
rules that reflect virtues of justice and beneficence, rules of morality that
typically provide reasons for the reasonable person to act that are decisive
with respect to competing reasons.42 For reasonable persons such moral
39 Herman develops this “device” of a deliberative field in “Making Room for Character,”
sec. IV.
40 Darwall, “Morality and Practical Reason,” p. 286.
41 See Smith’s discussion of the impartial spectator as establishing the standard of reason-
ableness in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (New York: Dover, 2006), Part I, Section I, chapters
III and IV, and Section II, chapters III and IV.
42 See Smith’s discussion of moral rules, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III, chapters
II–IV. Of particular relevance is his argument that although such rules are “commonly cited as
the ultimate foundation of what is just and unjust,” this is misleading. They are in fact formed
via the standpoint of the impartial spectator “from the experience we have had of the effects
which actions of all different kinds naturally produce upon us” (p. 154).
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rules typically generate rational standpoint moral verdicts, but the stand-
point from which such reasons come into view as providing the distinct-
ively moral reasons that they do is fundamentally the standpoint that
structures all of the sentiments of the reasonable person, the standpoint
of Smith’s impartial spectator.
For each of these theories moral requirements reflect decisive reasons
that are distinctively moral. It is from the standpoint of reasons/the
reasonable person that it becomes clear not only which reasons are
distinctively moral, but that in certain cases such distinctively moral
reasons are decisive with respect to other reasons. Agents are in such cases
rational standpoint morally required to act. A related point can be made
about many Hobbesian accounts as well. For a Hobbesian such as
Gauthier “the point of morality is surely to override preference,”43 to
generate rational standpoint moral verdicts that reflect decisive distinct-
ively moral reasons to act. It is the rational point of view, understood as
the point of view of preference maximization, that generates such
distinctively moral reasons. These distinctively moral reasons yield
rational standpoint moral verdicts that prohibit a rational agent from
acting “to realize his or her most preferred state of affairs.”44
These are three radically different approaches to moral theorizing, but
each is amenable to an interpretation upon which distinctively moral
reasons come into view fundamentally from the standpoint of reason
(Kant), the reasonable (Smith), or the rational (Gauthier). Morality
requires a particular course of action, on such accounts, when the reasons
simpliciter that are distinctively moral, e.g., the categorical, uncondi-
tional reasons of Kant, the reasons that constrain reasons for Gauthier,
and the reasons provided by moral rules reflecting the virtues of justice
and beneficence for Smith, provide decisive reasons simpliciter in favor
of some particular course of action. The moral standpoint sense of moral
verdict and moral overridingness need not even come into view.
The point is not to advocate any of these moral theories, or these
interpretations of moral theories, over alternatives. But their availability
as alternatives demonstrates the extent to which framing questions of
moral verdicts and moral overridingness exclusively within the context
43 David Gauthier, “Bargaining Our Way into Morality,” Philosophic Exchange 10 (1979),
p. 15.
44 Gauthier, “Bargaining Our Way into Morality,” p. 15.
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of the moral standpoint sense skews the debate among alternative views.
Such a framework rules out such moral theories ex ante, or shoehorns
them into a structure that systematically misrepresents the nature of the
alternatives they provide to moral theories that do appeal to moral
standpoint moral verdicts from a distinctively moral point of view.
Moreover, to put forward the moral standpoint sense as the sense
co-opts the concepts of moral verdict and moral overridingness such
that such moral theories cannot even be characterized as offering
accounts of rational standpoint moral verdicts and rational standpoint
overridingness.
SECTION IV: THE RATIONAL STANDPOINT SENSE WITHIN
THE MORAL STANDPOINT SENSE
In this section I will demonstrate that structural features characteristic of
the rational standpoint sense play a central role even in accounts that
purport to invoke only the contrasting moral standpoint sense of moral
verdict and moral overridingness. To see why, notice first how the
rational standpoint sense accommodates the standard objections to
moral overridingness that arise for those who deploy the moral stand-
point sense. Examples of such standard objections abound: An agent
arrives correctly at a moral standpoint moral verdict to promote the
overall good, but some other course of action, which only promotes
slightly less overall good, is much better for her or for her children.
Alternatively, an agent’s keeping his promised appointment is decisively
supported by reasons from the moral point of view, but he finds that he
must risk serious physical harm (due to illness) or forgo a tremendous
opportunity for personal benefit (phone call with a job offer) to keep his
promise. In general, if only certain reasons are taken into account from
the moral point of view, and only in certain respects, then, as Sarah
Stroud argues, “certain considerations which are genuine reasons have
been left out of the moral calculus,” and “we will get failures of over-
ridingness when something which clearly has force from the perspective
of reasons in general is not taken into account in reaching a moral
verdict.”45
45 Stroud, “Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory,” p. 180.
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Such failures of overridingness can indeed appear difficult to avoid
when operating within the moral standpoint sense, and these cases
highlight the difficulties. But consider such cases within the context of
the rational standpoint sense. Rational standpoint moral verdicts result,
and morality is rational standpoint overriding, in cases in which distinct-
ively moral reasons provide decisive reasons simpliciter. But these pur-
ported counterexamples are precisely cases in which it is held that
distinctively moral reasons fail to be decisive. For those who deploy the
rational standpoint sense, such piling up of non-moral considerations
does not show that the agent has sufficient reasons to do something other
than what morality requires, it shows that moral considerations are not
in such cases decisive, hence do not result in moral requirements. If non-
moral reasons of personal benefit are sufficiently weighty, for example,
then there is not a rational standpoint moral requirement to promote the
overall good because the relevant distinctively moral reasons to do so are
not rational standpoint overriding.
Many advocates of the moral standpoint sense readily allow that a
plausible moral theory must accommodate some such cases. Moral
theories that fail to do so, they allow, are too demanding or alienating
to provide plausible alternatives. These cases are often accommodated
within the moral standpoint sense of moral verdict by allowing that at
least some non-moral reasons are appropriately taken into account non-
instrumentally within the distinctively moral point of view. Philippa
Foot, herself no advocate of moral standpoint overridingness, nonethe-
less accounts for its apparent appeal as due in large part to the fact that
unlike the standpoint of etiquette, morality provides a distinctively
inclusive standpoint such that many exceptions reflecting non-moral
considerations are included “within morality:”
Moral rules are not taught as rigid rules that it is sometimes right to ignore;
rather we teach that it is sometimes morally permissible to tell lies (social lies),
break promises . . . and refuse help (where the cost of giving it would be, as we
say, disproportionate).46
46 Foot, “Are Moral Considerations Overriding?” in Virtues and Vices, p. 187. Only in her
subsequent statement, that such exceptions occur within morality, does it become clear that she
is operating within the moral standpoint sense.
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The suggestion is that certain non-moral reasons are appropriately
taken into account along with distinctively moral reasons in arriving
at moral verdicts from the moral point of view. Morality only issues
even moral standpoint moral verdicts, on such accounts, when such
non-moral reasons are not sufficiently weighty from the moral point of
view. Such an approach is seen as well in Scheffler’s argument that
personal reasons are comprehended within the standpoint from which
it is determined what, if anything, morality requires. If such non-moral
considerations are sufficiently weighty from the moral point of view,
morality does not yield even a moral standpoint moral requirement.47
Neither Foot nor Scheffler defends the substantive claim that morality
is moral standpoint overriding, but each accounts for the apparent
appeal of overridingness in part by highlighting the distinctive nature
of the point of view from which distinctively moral reasons come into
view, emphasizing that it comprehends certain non-moral reasons non-
instrumentally. Moral verdicts only issue from such a point of view in
cases in which distinctively moral reasons are decisive with respect to
non-moral reasons within this more comprehensive and inclusive
moral point of view.
Philosophers who operate within the moral standpoint sense, but who
are more sympathetic to the claim that morality is moral standpoint
overriding, emphasize even more the distinctiveness of the moral point
of view, in particular the comprehensiveness and inclusiveness of this
point of view. Thus, Seana Shiffrin argues that the moral point of view is
“a package of a special type of reasons and a special way of relating them
to all the other sorts”:48
On this picture, to take up the moral point of view is to see and evaluate a whole
range of reasons from a distinctive, objective point of view . . . It both introduces
certain distinctive considerations as having reason-giving force and offers a
methodology for regarding and resolving conflicts with competing, different
sorts of considerations.49
47 Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1982).
48 Seana Shiffrin, “Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism,” Ethics 109 (July 1999),
p. 791.
49 Shiffrin, “Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism,” p. 788.
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On such an understanding of the moral point of view, the considerations
cited in alleged counterexamples as competing with reasons generated
from the moral point of view are themselves taken into account non-
instrumentally from the moral point of view in the determination of
what, if anything, is moral standpoint morally required or forbidden.50
Similarly, Stroud maintains that from the moral point of view, properly
understood, “considerations which might otherwise have grounded a
moral requirement do not do so when there are strong personal costs on
the other side.”51 Such philosophers thus argue that although there is a
distinctively moral point of view, and there are distinctive moral verdicts
reflecting decisive reasons from such a point of view, it is a distinctively
comprehensive and inclusive point of view. It non-instrumentally com-
prehends the legitimate reasons provided by certain non-moral consid-
erations in the determination of what, if anything, is moral standpoint
morally required. If such other non-moral considerations are sufficiently
weighty from the moral point of view, morality simply does not yield a
moral standpoint moral verdict. Such defenders of moral standpoint
overridingness see the purported counterexamples not as evidence that
morality is not overriding, but as evidence of the impoverished nature of
the account of the standpoint from which moral verdicts issue.52
Thus, many philosophers working within the moral standpoint
account, both critics and defenders of moral standpoint overridingness,
maintain that the distinctively moral point of view from which distinct-
ively moral reasons come into view takes into account non-moral
reasons, appreciating the intrinsic value that they reflect. Moral stand-
point moral verdicts result only if the distinctively moral reasons that
come into view from such a standpoint are decisive with respect to such
50 Shiffrin: “On this view, morality’s distinctiveness issues, partly, from its attempt to offer a
superfunction of reasons” (“Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism,” p. 791).
51 Stroud, “Moral Overridingness andMoral Theory,” p. 184. Shiffrin makes a similar point
in her discussion of aesthetic considerations (“Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism,”
p. 791).
52 Shiffrin notes that moral considerations can also be taken into account from the pruden-
tial standpoint, but takes there to be a crucial difference: “Prudence may acknowledge the
significance of moral concerns but only for the instrumental value that moral obedience may
have for achieving one’s interest.” By contrast, “Morality . . . sees concerns emanating from the
personal point of view as having a certain intrinsic value and attempts to assess what their real
value is and how moral considerations relate to them” (“Moral Overridingness and Moral
Subjectivism,” p. 790).
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non-moral reasons from the moral point of view. These respects in which
the moral point of view is distinctive, moreover, generate a simulacrum
of rational standpoint moral verdicts within the context of moral stand-
point moral verdicts: moral standpoint moral verdicts are not just
rational verdicts from the distinctively moral point of view, but rational
verdicts for decisive distinctively moral reasons from such a distinctively
moral point of view. The question of moral standpoint overridingness,
on such accounts, is whether such rational verdicts for distinctively moral
reasons from the moral point of view (hence still moral standpoint moral
verdicts) also yield rational standpoint moral verdicts, rational verdicts
for decisive reasons simpliciter that are in some sense distinctively moral.
Those who are sympathetic to moral standpoint overridingness
emphasize the inclusion of virtually all reasons simpliciter within the
moral point of view, such that it is difficult to find significant space
between the moral standpoint, thus understood, and the standpoint of
reason simpliciter. Morality, on such accounts, is moral standpoint
overriding because rational verdicts for distinctively moral reasons from
the moral point of view—moral standpoint moral verdicts—are, de facto,
rational verdicts for distinctively moral reasons from the standpoint of
reason simpliciter—rational standpoint moral verdicts. Those who reject
moral standpoint overridingness within such a sophisticated moral
standpoint maintain that although the moral point of view includes
non-moral reasons, and only yields moral verdicts when distinctively
moral reasons are decisive with respect to such non-moral reasons,
nonetheless the reasons or weight of reasons from the standpoint of
reason diverge (or at least can diverge) from the reasons or weight of
reasons from the distinctively moral point of view.
But if on such accounts (1) the point of view from which distinctively
moral reasons come into view is a distinctively comprehensive point of
view, and (2) it only yields verdicts of the morally relevant sort if
distinctively moral reasons outweigh other relevant non-moral reason
from that point of view, and (3) it non-instrumentally includes non-
moral as well as moral reasons along with an account of how they relate
to each other, then it seems clear that in the quest for greater plausibility,
such sophisticated accounts operating within the moral standpoint sense
have taken on more and more of the features characteristic of the rational
standpoint sense. Moral standpoint moral verdicts become more plaus-
ible as they approach rational standpoint moral verdicts, and moral
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standpoint overridingness, at the limit, becomes indistinguishable from
rational standpoint overridingness. The limit case of such a process of
sophistication is a standpoint that comprehends all reasons, and gives
them the weight that they have as reasons simpliciter, yielding moral
standpoint moral verdicts only when distinctively moral reasons are
decisive. But such a limit case for moral standpoint moral verdicts
would simply be an account of rational standpoint moral verdicts, and
on such an account moral standpoint overridingness would simply be
rational standpoint overridingness.
SECTION V: THE INTERPLAY OF THE TWO SENSES
I have argued that although the moral standpoint sense dominates
philosophical debates concerning moral verdicts and moral overriding-
ness, it is the rational standpoint sense that most straightforwardly
accounts for the various intuitive conceptual connections between
moral requirement and decisive reasons for action. This rational stand-
point sense, moreover, is untroubled by alleged counterexamples to
moral overridingness that dominate the discussions of those operating
within the moral standpoint sense, and it is clearly the fundamental sense
of moral verdicts and moral overridingness for moral theories that
recognize a role for distinctively moral reasons, but not a fundamental
role for a distinctive class of moral verdicts that reflect only the decisive-
ness of reasons from a distinctively moral point of view. Finally, a
simulacrum of rational standpoint moral verdicts is articulated within
the moral point of view by more developed accounts that deploy the
moral standpoint sense, and the limit case for such development would
appear to be a complete alignment of the moral standpoint sense with
the rational standpoint sense.
I have made the case that those who operate exclusively within the
context of only one of these senses, and who assume that others do as
well, are talking past rather than engaging with many of their critics.
Such an assumption that either of these is the sense of moral verdicts and
moral overridingness within the context of which the claims of all moral
theories and all moral disputes are to be interpreted profoundly distorts
the debate from the outset. I have also suggested in the discussion of
Singer that certain arguments can easily trade upon the conflation of
aspects of these two senses. But nothing that I have argued so far makes
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the case that these senses cannot both be incorporated into one and the
same moral theory. In closing, I will make an initial effort to locate these
distinct senses with respect to each other in light of the insights gained in
the process of disambiguating them.
We have already seen that each is frequently put forward as the sense
of moral verdicts and moral overridingness. They are treated as compet-
ing and mutually exclusive alternatives. My suggestion is that there is
instead an important division of theoretical labor reflected in these two
senses, and that the assumption of mutual exclusivity and the hom-
onymous terminology make it difficult to recognize that each sense is
responsive to a fundamentally different question. The question of when
distinctively moral reasons are rationally authoritative—when moral
reasons are decisive reasons—is of the first importance for rational
agents. It is thus not at all surprising that one of our central senses of
moral verdicts, the rational standpoint sense, identifies the acts and act
types supported, at least ceteris paribus, by decisive distinctively moral
reasons. Nor is it surprising that such an understanding is deeply
embedded in our everyday moral practices. What we want to know, in
our interactions with each other, is which acts and act types we have
decisive moral reasons to perform—which actions are rational stand-
point morally required, supported by rational standpoint overriding
moral reasons. My suggestion is that this central question, to which
the rational standpoint sense is directly responsive, is relevant for almost
any moral theory, regardless of whether or not the theory also appeals to
distinctive moral standpoint moral verdicts from a distinctively moral
point of view.
For moral theories that do appeal to a distinctively moral point of
view and a distinctive class of verdicts that reflect decisive reasons from
such a point of view, the question of when some action or act type is
moral standpoint morally required will arise alongside that of when some
action or act type is rational standpoint morally required, as will the
question of the relationship between such requirements. It is crucial not
to conflate the question central to the rational standpoint sense, the
question of what acts and act types are required of rational agents by
decisive distinctively moral reasons, with the moral standpoint sense
questions that are relevant on some moral theories, questions of what
agents have decisive reasons to do from the moral point of view, and
what the relationship is between such decisive reasonableness from a
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distinctively moral point of view and decisive reasonableness simpliciter
for distinctively moral reasons.53
The question of moral standpoint overridingness, for example, is the
question of whether the moral standpoint moral verdicts that reflect
decisive reasons from the moral point of view are always reflected in
rational standpoint moral verdicts reflecting decisive reasons simpliciter
that are distinctively moral. Even if they are not, and morality is not on
such an account moral standpoint overriding, this still leaves remaining
the question of when such moral standpoint moral verdicts are reflected
in rational standpoint moral verdicts: When are rational agents rational
standpoint morally required to do what we are moral standpoint morally
required to do, such that rational agents have rational standpoint over-
riding moral reasons to do what is moral standpoint morally required?
Consider, in this regard, Susan Wolf ’s closing argument in “Moral
Saints.”54 She offers a characterization of moral theories from within
the moral standpoint sense. There is a distinctively moral point of view
which “demands expression in one’s actions and in the form of one’s
practical deliberations.”55 This moral point of view is a source of
distinctively moral reasons that we are “obliged to take up and express
in our actions.” But we may also have “positive, good reasons” that come
into view from the “point of view of individual perfection.”56 Taking
into account these other non-moral reasons, she argues, challenges the
meta-moral assumption that “it is always better to be morally better”57—
that morality is moral standpoint overriding. Nonetheless, these moral
reasons that come into view from the distinctively moral point of view
provide reasons simpliciter that every agent is obligated to take into
account in deciding what she has the best reasons simpliciter to do.
When such distinctively moral reasons are decisive, it will be better
simpliciter to do what is “morally better.” This question of when it is
better simpliciter to do what is morally better is the question of when
morality is rational standpoint overriding, such that agents are rational
53 For a perceptive discussion of such questions see Karl Schafer, “TheModesty of the Moral
Point of View,” in Weighing Reasons, ed. E. Lord and B. Maguire (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, forthcoming).
54 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy 79 (August 1982): 419–39.
55 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” p. 437.
56 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” pp. 436 and 437.
57 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” p. 438
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standpoint morally required to act. On Wolf ’s account agents do not
always have decisive reasons to do what they have decisive reasons to do
from the moral point of view, but they do sometimes have decisive
reasons simpliciter that are distinctively moral (are rational standpoint
morally required) to perform certain actions or types of actions.
In sum, my suggestion is that the question central to the rational
standpoint sense of moral verdict, the question so deeply embedded in
our moral practices, is the question of what, if anything, morality
demands of us as rational agents—what acts and act types we have
decisive distinctively moral reasons to perform. This question is relevant
for almost any moral theory, regardless of whether or not it appeals to
distinctive moral standpoint moral verdicts from a distinctively moral
point of view. Those who appeal to the rational standpoint sense of
moral verdicts deploy this intuitive use of moral verdict language, the
sense that reflects rationally authoritative moral reasons for some action
or act type. On theories that recognize in addition a distinctively moral
point of view and a distinctive sense of moral verdict that reflects decisive
reasons from such a point of view, an obvious question will be whether
such moral standpoint moral verdicts are always reflected in rational
standpoint moral verdicts (moral standpoint overridingness), or only
sometimes are. Theories that articulate accounts of moral standpoint
moral verdicts, in short, should not be understood as challenging the role
of rational standpoint moral verdicts, but, properly understood, as rais-
ing additional questions regarding the relationship between two senses of
verdicts and overridingness that reflect different fundamental questions.
My task here has been to distinguish the two very different senses of
moral verdicts and moral overridingness that are invoked both in our
moral practices and in our moral theories, and to make the case that the
assumption that one or the other is the sense that is or ought to be at
work in moral theory severely distorts both central debates in moral
theory and alternative positions within such debates. These are not rival
and mutually exclusive senses of verdicts and overridingness; they are
distinctive senses that are responsive to different fundamental questions
about morality and the role of morality within reason. For theories that
appeal to a distinctively moral point of view and distinctive moral
verdicts reflecting decisive reasons relative to such a point of view, an
adequate account must take up the relationship between these two very
different senses of moral verdict and moral overridingness, and must be
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clear about the answers it provides to the very different questions to
which each sense is responsive.
Acknowledgments
Much thanks to participants in the Claremont Colleges Works in
Progress Group and the 2015 Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics
for extremely helpful discussions of earlier drafts of this paper. I have
benefited in particular from conversations with Sarah Stroud, Douglas
Portmore, Stephen Darwall, Susan Wolf, Barry Maguire, Dustin Locke,
Alex Rajczi, Julie Tannenbaum, Andrew Schroeder, Peter Thielke, and
RivkaWeinberg. I have also benefited from insightful feedback from two
anonymous referees. Special thanks to Mark Timmons for running his
superb workshop every year and editing the resulting volume.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 17/5/2016, SPi
240 Paul Hurley
